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Introduction 
 
 
The Fatah–Hamas Reconciliation 
Agreement of October 2017 
An Opportunity to End Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis and Permanently 
Overcome the Blockade 
Muriel Asseburg 
Ten years after Hamas violently seized power in Gaza, and following a string of failures 
to reconcile the Palestinian factions, there are now signs of a rapprochement between 
Fatah and Hamas. In September 2017 the Hamas leadership announced it would dis-
solve the administrative committee it had established in March, opening the way for 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take over the government in the Gaza Strip. In mid-
October representatives of Hamas and Fatah signed an Egyptian-mediated reconcilia-
tion agreement. On 1 November PA forces were deployed to the Palestinian side of the 
Rafah border crossing with Egypt. Even if there are still major obstacles to merging 
the two security apparatuses, establishing a unity government, restoring the democratic 
process and achieving comprehensive reconciliation – the chances of the rapproche-
ment preventing another round of armed conflict and improving the situation for the 
population in crisis-ridden Gaza are considerably better this time around. Germany 
and its European partners should help to accentuate the positive dynamics, support 
permanent improvements of the situation in Gaza through practical steps and work 
towards comprehensive reconciliation between the Palestinian factions. 
 
In practical terms the 12 October 2017 agree-
ment between the two largest Palestinian 
factions foresees the Palestinian Authority 
assuming control of Gaza’s border crossings 
by 1 November 2017, taking over the gov-
ernment of the Gaza Strip by 1 December 
2017, and integrating staff appointed by 
Hamas over the last ten years (about 40,000, 
roughly half in civilian functions, half in 
the security sector) by 1 February 2018. 
Restructuring of security apparatuses and 
further reconciliation measures are also to 
be discussed. On 21 November the smaller 
Palestinian factions are invited to put their 
signatures to the agreement in Cairo, too. 
In the first week of December, also in Cairo, 
a joint stocktaking will be held to assess 
progress and discuss next steps. 
The May 2011 agreement between the 
Palestinian factions serves as the basis and 
point of reference for the new document. 
Acknowledging lessons learned from fail-
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ures of implementing earlier agreements, 
this time only steps subject to consensus are 
to be implemented for now, while politi-
cally sensitive measures have been post-
poned until a later stage. This means that 
steps mentioned in the 2011 agreement, 
such as forming a unity government, re-
activating the Palestinian Legislative Coun-
cil, holding parliamentary and presidential 
elections, Hamas joining the PLO, and struc-
tural and programmatic reforms within the 
PLO, have been kicked down the road. Yet 
those are the measures that would be re-
quired to actually overcome the political rift. 
Chances Improved 
It is therefore much too early to speak of 
the intra-Palestinian division being over-
come, still less of a comprehensive recon-
ciliation between the factions. Even imple-
mentation of the concrete points agreed 
upon will be a complex undertaking. Not 
only do relations between Hamas and Fatah 
remain beset by rivalry and great mistrust. 
Ten years of separation have also created 
two parallel administrations, two judicial 
systems and two security apparatuses. The 
legal systems – which already stem from 
different traditions – have been levered 
further apart by Abbas’s presidential 
decrees on the one side and legislation 
adopted by Gaza’s rump parliament on 
the other (on the impacts of the West Bank/ 
Gaza split see SWP Comments 42/2017). 
Nevertheless, it currently looks as if 
the agreement signed on 12 October will 
indeed be implemented. Concrete prepara-
tions for the PA to assume administrative 
responsibility in Gaza were set in motion 
immediately under the direction of the 
Egyptian intelligence service. In early 
November the presidential guard was 
deployed to the Rafah border crossing as 
scheduled. Hamas also closed down its 
checkpoints next to the PA staffed termi-
nals at the Erez and Kerem Shalom border 
crossings as demanded by Israel. Detailed 
plans for dealing with public sector em-
ployees have already been drawn up with 
Swiss support; these are now to be im-
plemented by a committee set up for the 
purpose. The decisive factors behind the 
improved prospects for implementing 
the reconciliation agreement this time are 
changes in the interests of Hamas and the 
Palestinian president, Egypt’s active role in 
implementing the agreement, and a green 
light from the United States and Israel. 
Realpolitik in Hamas 
In the process of participating in elections 
(local in 2004/2005 and parliamentary in 
2006) – and thereby at least de facto recog-
nising the framework of the Israeli-Pales-
tinian Oslo Accords of the 1990s under 
which they were held – and governing from 
2006 onwards, Realpolitik has increasingly 
gained the upper hand within Hamas. Its 
representatives have come to realise that 
they will not be able to end the occupation 
(or even just the blockade of Gaza) through 
military action and on their own. This 
stance also aligns with the war-weary mood 
of Gaza’s populace, whose priorities are 
concrete improvements in living conditions 
and overcoming the Palestinian division. 
The Hamas leadership has also come to 
realise that continuing to govern under 
the Israeli-Egyptian blockade, far-reaching 
international isolation, and sanctions im-
posed by the PA is doomed to failure and 
greatly harms its popularity. Additionally, 
the pressures of everyday crisis manage-
ment distract from focusing on achieving 
national liberation. 
The narrowing scope of action of the de 
facto government in Gaza in recent years 
has certainly expedited these insights. 
Abdelfattah al-Sisi’s accession to power in 
Egypt in mid-2013 largely ended the flour-
ishing trade through tunnels under the 
Egypt/Gaza border, depriving the de facto 
government of an important source of 
revenues in the form of levies on smuggled 
goods and on the operation of tunnels. 
Qatar, which was the main sponsor of infra-
structure projects in Gaza in recent years, 
noticeably dialled back its support after the 
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embargo imposed in June 2017 by Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Egypt and others placed it under pressure 
to also distance itself from Hamas (on the 
Qatar crisis see SWP Comments 25/2017). 
Sanctions imposed by Ramallah in response 
to Hamas’s establishment of an administra-
tive committee in March 2017 caused a 
dramatic escalation of the humanitarian 
crisis. Punitive measures included cutting 
the salaries paid to PA staff in Gaza, reduc-
ing payments to Israel for electricity for 
Gaza, and scaling back medical services 
available to Gazans. 
Against this backdrop the Hamas leader-
ship now sees only one option for initiating 
positive change and at the same time main-
taining a political role: reconcile with 
Ramallah, forego exclusive responsibility 
for governing in Gaza and mend fences 
with the Egyptian leadership, which in 
2015 categorised it as a terrorist organisa-
tion and banned it from operating in Egypt. 
Although he continues to make radical 
statements on Israel, Yahya Sinwar stands 
for this pragmatic course. In October 2011 
he was released from imprisonment in 
Israel after twenty-two years, in the scope 
of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange, and 
in February 2017 elected leader of Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip (succeeding Ismail Haniyeh). 
Local observers agree that Sinwar is deter-
mined to stay his chosen course and will be 
able to defend it against hardliners. It helps 
that he comes from Hamas’s military wing, 
the Izz-al-Din-al-Qassam Brigades, and can 
depend on their support. 
At the same time, the election of Ismail 
Haniyeh as leader of Hamas’s political 
bureau in May 2017 (succeeding Khaled 
Meshal) has shifted decision-making – and 
thus the centre of interest – back from 
Qatar to Gaza. And the election of Saleh 
al-Arouri, a representative of Hamas in the 
West Bank now resident in Lebanon, as 
deputy leader of the political bureau in 
early October 2017 is yet another indication 
of a shift in influence from representatives 
of the diaspora to representatives of the 
Palestinian Territories in the Hamas organs. 
It was Arouri, who also originates from 
the military wing, who signed the recon-
ciliation agreement on behalf of Hamas. 
Abbas under Pressure 
Three recent developments in particular 
pressure President Mahmoud Abbas to pur-
sue reconciliation with Hamas seriously 
this time. Firstly, his popularity has plum-
meted, especially in Gaza. In a survey con-
ducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy 
and Survey Research (PSR) in mid-Septem-
ber 2017, about two-thirds of respondents 
said they thought the president should 
stand down; the figure for Gaza was as 
high as 80 percent. If presidential elections 
with two candidates, Abbas and Haniyeh, 
were held now, Abbas could expect to lose 
against Hamas leader Haniyeh, with 42 per-
cent as against 50 percent. Abbas’s Fatah 
has also haemorrhaged support, above all 
in Gaza where it fell from 40 percent at 
the turn of the year to 28 percent in mid-
September. 
Secondly, since summer 2017 Egypt and 
the UAE have been fostering a reconcilia-
tion between Hamas and Fatah renegade 
Mohammed Dahlan, the former head of the 
Preventive Security Force in Gaza. This has 
brought one of the president’s most im-
portant rivals back on the political stage. 
Dahlan was one of the central figures on 
the Fatah side responsible for the armed 
clashes of June 2007 that cost almost four 
hundred lives, ended the short-lived ex-
periment of the Palestinian National Unity 
Government, and initiated the division of 
the Palestinian Territories into two entities 
with competing governments (for details 
see SWP Comments 14/2007). Dahlan was 
expelled from Fatah in June 2011 on charges 
including corruption and treason. The 
motivation behind the expulsion appears 
to have been massive accusations of involve-
ment in corruption and extortion levelled 
by Dahlan against Abbas’s sons Tareq and 
Yasser. He was subsequently convicted on 
various charges by PA courts and sentenced 
to fines and prison terms. 
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In recent years Dahlan has systematically 
expanded his power base in the Gaza Strip 
and refugee camps in the West Bank and 
neighbouring states, with financial support 
from the UAE, where he is now based. While 
he has demonstrated willingness to recon-
cile with the president, as demanded by 
Egypt, he is also pressing ahead with the 
establishment of separate party structures 
in the form of the Fatah Reformist and 
Democratic Party. Dahlan’s rapprochement 
with Hamas has further undermined Abbas’s 
position. For example in June 2017 Dahlan 
arranged for Egypt to supply diesel for Gaza’s 
power station, counteracting Ramallah’s 
sanctions. He has also initiated a programme 
of social reconciliation involving apologies 
and compensation for the families of those 
killed in the 2007 clashes. The process has 
been making good progress. And surveys 
show Dahlan’s support in Gaza more than 
doubling since the beginning of the year to 
23 percent. 
Thirdly, Egypt is not alone in backing 
the reconciliation efforts. The United States 
also appears to have given a green light, 
with the Trump Administration believing 
that its ambitions for “the ultimate deal” to 
end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only 
succeed if the PA president and PLO leader 
speaks for the entirety of the Palestinian 
Territories. Washington therefore regards 
the PA assuming responsibility for govern-
ment and security in Gaza as the first step 
towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. 
Other regional powers like Saudi Arabia 
have also given their backing to Egypt’s 
mediation efforts. Even the Israeli govern-
ment, which is concerned to contain spill-
over effects from the crisis in Gaza and 
avoid undermining Egypt, has mostly re-
frained from disrupting the reconciliation 
process – while reiterating its refusal to 
negotiate with a Hamas-backed govern-
ment. Altogether, therefore, Abbas can no 
longer find backers for his intransigent 
stance. 
Egypt as Active Mediator 
The active participation of a third party to 
oversee adherence to the agreed timetable 
and put pressure on either side as needed 
will be as vital for implementation of the 
reconciliation agreement as it was for its 
creation. Egypt appears determined to 
make a success of what is now the seventh 
reconciliation agreement between Fatah 
and Hamas. This is evidenced not least by 
the prominent role played by Khaled Fawzi, 
the head of Egypt’s intelligence service. 
Cairo is pursuing three principal inter-
ests. Firstly, it wants to get a grip on secu-
rity in Sinai, which has been beset for years 
by armed clashes between the Egyptian 
army and jihadist groups. To that end it has 
agreed close cooperation with Hamas on 
fighting cross-border terrorism and active 
measures against jihadists in Gaza. In 
return it has raised the prospect of a regu-
lar opening of the Rafah Crossing (now 
scheduled to start in mid-November), and 
enabled Hamas cadres to travel via Egypt 
and to resume a presence in there. Dahlan’s 
mediation and UAE backing were essential 
in working towards a reconciliation be-
tween Egypt and Hamas and concentrating 
on shared interests – rather than focussing 
on conflicting interests as in earlier rounds. 
But the rapprochement only became pos-
sible after Hamas distanced itself from its 
parent organisation, the Muslim Brother-
hood, which is public enemy number one 
in Egypt (see below for more on the Hamas 
policy document). 
Secondly, with Washington signalising 
engagement for an Israeli-Palestinian peace 
agreement, Egypt would like to position 
itself as an indispensable partner and rele-
vant regional power. In this context Cairo 
also regards the Fatah-Hamas agreement 
and the factional reconciliation under its 
auspices as an opportunity to minimise 
the influence of Qatar and Turkey in its im-
mediate neighbourhood and to strengthen 
ties with the UAE. 
Thirdly, Egypt must be interested in pre-
paring the succession to Abbas – who is over 
eighty – in order to avoid chaos ensuing 
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when he dies. In this vein, it is in Cairo’s 
interest to block any potential Israeli ini-
tiatives in such a situation (such as annex-
ing parts of the West Bank or altering the 
status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram 
al-Sharif) that could lead to further regional 
destabilisation and would endanger the 
increasingly close Egyptian-Israeli security 
cooperation. 
Disarming Hamas? 
It is unrealistic to expect Hamas to disband 
its military wing, generally renounce vio-
lence or break off ties with Iran against the 
backdrop of the continuing Israeli occu-
pation and the sobering example of Fatah. 
While renouncing violence, recognising 
Israel and engaging in security cooperation 
with the occupying power have allowed 
Fatah to acquire international acceptance, 
it has been unable to make any progress 
towards independence or even towards 
lasting improvements in living conditions. 
Still, since the 2014 military confronta-
tions in Gaza Hamas has demonstrated that 
it is certainly able to reconcile the rhetoric 
of resistance with the assumption of secu-
rity responsibilities. It has since then – as 
acknowledged by the Israeli security estab-
lishment – observed the cease-fire and largely 
prevented other militant groups from in-
filtrating or attacking Israel from Gaza. 
After its reconciliation with Egypt in 
summer 2017, Hamas also began creating 
a buffer zone along the border with Sinai 
and taking active measures to stop militant 
jihadists, who had previously been able to 
operate largely unhindered across the bor-
der. Both the Israeli and the Egyptian secu-
rity establishments are well aware that not 
only are Hamas’s Qassam Brigades vital to 
any operation against radical forces in the 
Gaza Strip, but also that dissolving them 
would leave disbanded fighters outside cen-
tral control and potentially turning to 
more radical groups.  
Fatah and Hamas have also agreed ver-
bally in October 2017 to avoid any actions 
that could endanger their agreement. This 
implies not only continuing to observe the 
cease-fire in Gaza, but also refraining from 
armed attacks in the West Bank (which has 
been Hamas practice anyway since summer 
2014). 
Adjusting the Political Programme 
The preamble to the reconciliation agree-
ment names as its objective – in line with 
the PLO charter – the aspirations of the 
Palestinian people to a sovereign state in 
the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, 
with Jerusalem as its capital, and the return 
of the refugees. 
In May 2017 Hamas had already pub-
lished a new policy document based on in-
tense and controversial internal discus-
sions. It supplements the Hamas covenant 
of 1988 and now serves as the organisa-
tion’s official ideological platform. Even if 
Hamas continues to define itself as a resist-
ance movement, upholds the long-term 
goal of “the full and complete liberation 
of Palestine” (meaning the territory of the 
former British mandate for Palestine), 
refuses to renounce violence, and declines 
to recognise Israel’s legitimacy, the docu-
ment nevertheless contains important 
shifts towards Realpolitik. Hamas now 
locates itself within the “national [Palestin-
ian] consensus” by accepting a Palestinian 
State within the 1967 borders, at least as 
an interim solution. And the document no 
longer speaks of the destruction of Israel. 
Additionally, the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict is no longer framed as a religious one. 
Hamas, the document asserts, “does not 
wage a struggle against the Jews because 
they are Jewish” but rejects Zionism and 
occupation. It recognises the PLO as the 
“national framework for the Palestinian 
people” and accepts the role of the PA, even 
if it rejects the Oslo Accords on the grounds 
that they contravene international law by 
generating “commitments that violate the 
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people”. 
Furthermore, this document no longer 
references ties to Hamas’s parent organisa-
tion, the Muslim Brotherhood, but instead 
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emphasises the movement’s national objec-
tives and rejects intervention in the inter-
nal affairs of other states – both of which 
are clear messages to Egypt. 
Policy Recommendations 
In important dimensions of the reconcilia-
tion process agreement has yet to be reached 
between Hamas and Fatah. Merging appa-
ratuses under the auspices of the PA will 
be a tricky undertaking. And there are 
other major obstacles to a comprehensive 
reconciliation. In particular, the Palestinian 
president and his Fatah party may lack 
motivation to hold elections, in view of the 
splits within the party and loss of popular-
ity. Also, integrating Hamas into the PLO, 
reforming the organisation and revising its 
charter would all be potentially explosive 
manoeuvres against the backdrop of the 
failure of the Oslo Process. 
At the same time, the regional dynamics 
have placed Fatah and Hamas – and the gov-
ernments in Ramallah and Gaza City – 
under pressure to reconcile. Egypt appears 
determined to make a success of the 12 
October agreement. This opens up an op-
portunity to prevent another military con-
frontation in the Gaza Strip, to tackle the 
humanitarian crisis there, and to create 
the basis for sustainable economic develop-
ment. Whether the factional division can 
also be overcome will depend decisively on 
the behaviour of the regional actors (espe-
cially Egypt and Israel) and the internation-
al community (above all the United States 
and the European Union). 
The EU and its member states should 
actively support the Palestinian rapproche-
ment and signalise interest in its success 
to all sides, rather than simply watching 
as events unfold. After all, they have been 
calling on the Palestinians to overcome the 
division since 2007. Palestinian unity is also 
a precondition for returning to the demo-
cratic process in the Palestinian Territories, 
for upholding the option of a two-state settle-
ment, and for the legitimacy of any Pales-
tinian negotiating team in future talks. 
That means first clearly communicat-
ing to the Palestinians the expectation 
that they implement the planned steps in 
accordance with the timetable and spirit 
of the agreement, and pressing Israel to 
refrain from torpedoing the efforts. That 
also includes the lifting of sanctions against 
Gaza promised by the Palestinian president, 
which will be crucial for achieving a rapid 
improvement in living conditions for the 
population there. 
Beyond this it is crucial to help ensure 
that concrete steps stemming from the 
agreement, such as merging the two public 
sectors, do not fail for lack of resources. To 
that end the EU, in close coordination with 
Egypt, Switzerland and Gulf Arab donors 
should backstop public sector salaries for 
the coming months. At the same time it 
should help prepare plans to ensure that a 
slimming down of the bloated public appa-
ratus does not produce losers and lead to 
impoverishment, but instead proceeds in 
step with the creation of employment in 
the private sector. Appropriate severance 
and pension arrangements will also need 
to be found. 
The EU and its member states should 
also express their expectation that Pales-
tinian reconciliation will lead, via elections 
and the reestablishment of an effective 
division of powers, to a restoration of the 
democratic process (as postulated in the 
preamble to the reconciliation agreement). 
In this connection they should offer not 
only technical support for staging and 
monitoring elections. They should also seek 
to get Washington on board, in order to 
guarantee the political conditions for elec-
tions to take place. That means in particu-
lar leaning on Israel to permit free, fair 
and competitive elections (albeit under the 
restrictive conditions of ongoing occupa-
tion) in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
At the same time, the EU and its member 
states should unambiguously signal their 
willingness to cooperate with a consensus 
government supported by both Fatah and 
Hamas and with a future government of 
national unity including representatives 
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of both factions. In this connection it should 
refrain from imposing new conditions and 
instead abide by the terms for cooperation 
already formulated in EU Council Conclu-
sions of May 2011 and July 2014: namely, 
that the Palestinian government should 
respect existing agreements with Israel, 
renounce violence and recognise Israel’s 
right to exist. 
EU member states should also work to 
reinforce the pragmatic current in Hamas 
by relaxing the “no contact policy” adopted 
by the Middle East Quartet (United States, 
Russian Federation, European Union and 
United Nations) after the 2006 Palestinian 
elections. Even if the EU continues to clas-
sify Hamas as a terrorist organisation, that 
need not preclude political and civil society 
exchange. The expansion of contacts should 
not be made contingent upon unrealistic 
conditions or paying lip-service, nor should 
it come at the expense of dialogue with 
representatives of other Palestinian parties. 
Rather it should occur within the frame-
work of multi-party delegations (for ex-
ample mixed parliamentary groups) and by 
including moderate representatives of the 
movement in civil society dialogues. Along-
side implementation of the reconciliation 
agreement, important topics for such con-
tacts would also include improving the 
human rights situation and expanding the 
space open to civil society. 
EU member states should also grasp the 
reconciliation agreement as an opportunity 
to overcome the humanitarian crisis in 
Gaza and to transform circumstances there 
in such a way as to enable comprehensive 
reconstruction, sustainable economic devel-
opment and tackling the grave environmen-
tal problems. That will necessitate lifting 
the blockade and enabling permanent free-
dom of movement for people and goods. In 
this connection Europe should offer contri-
butions designed to reconcile the needs of 
Gaza’s population with Israel’s security in-
terests, for example by deploying observers 
and training border officials in the scope of 
a border mission, by supplying equipment 
for screening export goods etc. As a first 
step Germany should, in close consultation 
with Egypt, offer its good offices to mediate 
an exchange of prisoners and a long-term 
cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. 
Last but not least, measures aiming to 
improve the concrete situation in Gaza 
have to be part and parcel of a European 
policy focused on ending the occupation of 
the Palestinian territories and achieving a 
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
(for detail on concrete measures see SWP 
Comments 36/2017). 
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